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MINIMAL REALISM 
 
 This paper offers an argument against the view that science cannot tell us anything about the 
real world. It is useful at the very start to clarify the target philosophical position. It consists of 
three interlocking issues. First comes the inherent inadequacy of the correspondence theory of truth, 
which is an essential constituent of realism. Realists explain the difference between true judgements 
and false ones by appealing to an extra-linguistic reality. This is problematic because we cannot 
hold up our representations alongside the world to assess their adequacy to it. There does not seem 
to be any means of grasping reality other than through linguistic representation. This leads to the 
second argument, namely that scientific explanation is necessarily bound within some conceptual 
framework. From here the third step is usually to consider science as one particular universe of 
discourse among many others. We do not have the right to say that one universe of discourse gets 
nearer to the truth than others. Moreover, history seems to teach us that the scientific language-
game changes with time. What used to be considered truly existing, like phlogiston, may eventually 
come to be considered a non-referring term, a fiction. This three dimensional anti-realist position as 
regards science is usually taken to be the outcome of the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein, and 
some authors quote him at length to show explicitly how his insights support this type of refutation 
of scientific realism.1 
 
 The argument in this paper against this view has three steps. First of all we have to analyse 
briefly whether this reading of Wittgenstein is in fact justifiable. The least we will be entitled to say 
is that such a use of Wittgenstein is onesided. The second step will consist in discussing a possible 
objection coming from Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science. After the rejection of this objection, 
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the final step will be a generalisation of the whole argument so as to arrive at the justification of a 
minimal version of realism. 
 
 The use of the later Wittgenstein in support of antirealism usually makes use of his emphasis 
on the primary role of language-games. Some accordingly insist that it is a mistake to look for an 
explanation of what happens ‘outside language’ as it were. It is a mistake to look for an explanation 
of what is described by language. What we ought to do is to look at what happens as a ‘proto-
phenomenon’. In other words, we ought to be content with saying: this language-game is played. 
(PI § 654) Wittgenstein says explicitly that we should ‘look on the language-game as the primary 
thing.’ (PI § 656) Antirealists may also allude to his insight that that which makes us decide that 
something is true or false cannot itself be true or false. The rules governing our language-game, 
constituting our grammar, are antecedent to truth. It does not make sense to argue whether our 
tradition, that supplies the criteria for us to say that particular scientific claims are true, is itself true 
or false. It does not make sense precisely because we normally do not feel entitled to judge about 
truth and falsity from a supra-scientific point of view.2 
 
 But this is only one particular reading of Wittgenstein. On what grounds should we chose 
one reading rather than another? In general, one may suggest that the correct reading of an author is 
one which maximises the consistency of his ideas. In the case of Wittgenstein, this is notoriously 
difficult, given his style of writing. I would like to suggest that another way of judging the merits of 
different readings is to assess the author’s area of attention. It is true that Wittgenstein seems to 
attend most of the time to the workings of grammar, but in some places he clearly indicates that 
language-games are not completely arbitrary. He mentions for example that language-games are 
obviously ‘conditioned by certain facts’ (OC § 617) and the fact that he mentions this is significant 
even though he adds that what he wants to concentrate on is the meaning of this. He mentions in 
one of his manuscripts that ‘the technique of the use of a word gives us an idea of very general 
                                                 
2  The relevant works are Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C.K. Ogden, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul (1922); Philosophical Investigations,  Blackwell (1953); On Certainty, trans. D. Paul and G.E.M. 
Anscombe, Blackwell, (1979). For interesting links between passages in the Philosophical Investigations and other 
writings of Wittgenstein, a useful reference is Hallett, G., A companion to Wittgenstein's "Philosophical 
Investigations", Cornell University Press (1977). 
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truths about the world in which it is used.’3 It seems therefore that there is an aspect of his work 
which was not directly the object of his attention but which may still be very relevant to us. My 
suggestion is that, for my purposes here, we may legitimately attempt to draw from Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy some useful conclusions concerning the conditions of possibility of a language-game. 
 
 An example from the Philosophical Investigations may be helpful to illustrate the point. In § 
142 we have:  
 
‘The procedure of putting a lump of cheese on a balance and fixing the price by the 
turn of the scale would lose its point if it frequently happened for such lumps to 
suddenly grow or shrink for no obvious reason.’  
Here Wittgenstein desires to make the point that a certain degree of normality or regularity is 
always presupposed in the use of a word. Things break down if the rule becomes the exception and 
the exception the rule. In  the practice of weighing and in the language-game we associate with it, 
we are admittedly dealing with something arbitrary as far as the units of measurement and the 
apparatus used are concerned. However, there is an essential necessary condition behind both the 
practice and the language we associate with it, namely the fact that our world is such that objects do 
not change their weight unexpectedly and for no reason. It is at this point that I would like to 
identify a certain type of realism. It is here, at the level of the conditions of possibility of practice 
and language-game, that we are capable of coming up with some general truths about the external 
world, or to use the usual realist vocabulary, some facts about the mind-independent reality.  
 
 Having sketched my approach to the problem, we can now move to the second section of 
this paper. It involves the analysis of a possible objection that comes from recent work in 
philosophy of science. It could be observed that the example under consideration involves what 
scientists call, or used to call, the law of conservation of mass. What Wittgenstein was suggesting 
by his example corresponds to what scientists present in the form of a law, supposedly describing 
one of the fundamental characteristics of the world. Now it is undeniable that this law has suffered a 
lot of changes. In fact, even the very concept of mass has undergone considerable refinements since 
antiquity. And because of recent developments, as is well known, we do not speak anymore of the 
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conservation of mass but of the conservation of mass-energy. What used to be considered strictly 
unchanging has been shown to be changeable after all. We start therefore appreciating the force of 
the objection. Scientific theories are dependent on a world view, as Thomas Kuhn has insistently 
argued. A scientific revolution involves a change of world view, or even — as those who take the 
complete antirealist plunge may suggest — a change in the world, tout court. If history teaches us 
that a scientific world view may be here today and gone tomorrow, there is nothing that can justify 
a realist interpretation of the law of conservation of mass. It is therefore wrong to try to extract a 
fact about the real world from the Wittgensteinian example of the practice of weighing. 
 
 This objection however does not make the required distinction between everyday practice 
and scientific practice. This is where we can pin-point its weakness. It is true that nowadays we do 
not consider the law of conservation of mass as obtaining. But this is the case only as far as high-
energy physics is concerned. In everyday life it still obtains. The disappearance of our language-
game of weighing will come about if the law of conservation of mass does not hold in our everyday 
practice. And, as we know, this is not the case. In other words, everyday violation would certainly 
make the language-game impossible, but high-energy violation does not. So the question is: in what 
way does the precondition inscribed in this language-game tell us something about the real world? 
It tells us the following. It tells us that the world is such that, for everyday practice, the law of 
conservation of mass holds. And this is something that relativity physics not only does not refute, 
but also seeks to be in accordance with — to save face, as it were. In spite of the Kuhnian insistence 
on the uncertainty within any ontological claims regarding theoretical entities in science, the 
language-game of weighing tells us something which all future scientific theories will consider a 
constraint. 
 
 Let us try to generalise the conclusions drawn from this example involving weighing. This 
will constitute the third and final step in my paper.  
 
 Up to now I have argued that there is an essential necessary condition behind both the 
practice of weighing and the corresponding language-game, namely the fact that our world is such 
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that objects do not change their weight unexpectedly and for no reason. The conditions of 
possibility of practice and language-game will enable us to identify a certain type of realism. 
Consider another example. In tennis we cannot have a rule saying that no player is allowed to hit 
the ball in such a way that it remains suspended in mid-air. Why? Because such a rule does not 
make sense in the type of world we live in — precisely because of the constraints of the real world. 
So I am not claiming that Wittgenstein was wrong when we said that grammar is antecedent to 
truth. I am not disagreeing with the claim that the grammar which gives rise to our ordinary 
language is created by moves which we ourselves make. In fact, it is very valuable to realise that 
the impersonal treatment in the Tractatus should be replaced by a certain degree of 
anthropocentrism as we find in the Philosophical Investigations. Philosophy of language depends 
on philosophy of action. That is fine. But our action — and this is the crucial point — is dependent 
on the constraints imposed on us by the world.  
 
 To what extent are we entitled to have knowledge of these constraints? This question needs 
special attention. Two points will be mentioned briefly in this respect.  
 
 First of all, the objection concerning paradigm shifts and scientific revolutions must be 
taken seriously. If we hold that theories change and therefore the ontological status of theoretical 
entities changes accordingly as well, then we also have to admit that nothing can reassure us that 
any given language-game is established eternally. For all we know, a future scientific discovery 
may render some of our most cherished language-games completely outmoded. Again this may 
seem to undermine any attempt on our part to extract from their constraints some facts about the 
world. The worry is only superficial, however. We concede that any given language-game may be 
substituted by another. The question is the following. How are we to explain (i) why we need to 
change one language-game into another; and (ii) on what criteria we choose the new one? The only 
plausible explanation I can see that does not render the rules of grammar completely capricious is 
this: some specific language-games are responsible to reality in the sense that if the world were 
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different, certain features of them would no longer be useful.4 It may worry us to realise that any 
given fact about the world we extract from a language-game, like the conservation of mass in 
everyday practice, may turn out to be wrong. But this does not undermine my using the term 
realism in this context. My position portrayed so far is realist to the extent that it works with the 
following three presuppositions: that there is a world independent of our conceiving it; that we are 
capable of coming to know something about it; and that there is always the possibility of error.5  
 
 The second point concerns a possible challenge launched in this context by relativists. They 
may object that my position is pretentious because it suggests that something must be common to 
all possible conceptual frameworks. In my claim there is an unacceptable dose of conceptual 
colonialism. They may say: isn’t it always possible to meet other beings who might think and 
reason in accordance with thought-constraints completely different from our own? The simple 
answer is no. To see why the answer is no we have only to think of what is involved in this 
imaginary encounter with such beings.6 We are presupposing two steps. First we make the 
judgement that they are capable of thinking or reasoning. Then we conclude that their thinking and 
reasoning is completely different from our own. But here the inherent problem comes to light. At 
the first step, how can we identify a process and call it thinking if it is completely different from our 
own? For thinking to be recognised as thinking at all, it must have some common element with our 
thinking. The constraints we have on thinking partly define what counts as thinking. So in the end 
we have to admit that it is not possible to meet beings who think in a way completely different from 
us. It is therefore permissible to look for the elements which are common to all types of thinking, 
common to all conceptual frameworks.  
 
                                                 
4  For a deeper study into the relationship between necessity and usefulness in Wittgenstein see Baker, G.P., Hacker 
P.M.S., Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity. An analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations, 
volume 2, Blackwell, (1985), p. 330. 
5  My approach is examined by Lars Hertzberg in relation to the problem of scepticism. See his ‘On the Factual 
Dependence of the Language-Game’, Acta Philosophica Fennica 28 (1976), pp. 126-153. Reprinted in Canfield, John, 
(ed.) Knowing, Naming, Certainty and Idealism. (The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, Volume 8) Garland Publishing 
Company, (1986), pp. 290-317. 
6  This line of argument is similar D. Davidson’s in his ‘On the very idea of Conceptual Scheme’, Proceedings and 
Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 57 (1974), pp. 5-20. Reprinted in Inquiries into Truth and 
Interpretation, Clarendon (1984). 
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 Let us recapitulate the line of argument. First of all we recalled that Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy is sometimes taken to support an antirealist position. It is nevertheless important to draw 
our attention to some important aspects of his thought concerning the conditions of possibility of a 
language-game. An example was considered involving the practice of weighing. Against this, it can 
be argued that all laws of physics can in no way be considered a-temporal. However we cannot 
neglect the fact that everyday practice involves constraints which must be accounted for by all 
subsequent physical theories. The constraints within a language-game are thus quite significant. 
They may not be the justification of any particular form of representation. They are significant 
however in the sense of being the foundation of our representations. Grammar may be considered to 
be dependent on action, but action is to a certain degree limited by the type of beings we are and by 
the type of world we live in. It is in this sense that at least a minimal form of realism can be 
vindicated. 
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